This is a copy of paper obtained from American University in Washington, D.C. There is a project there called the Trade and Environment Database that produces case studies on the effects of trade agreements/policies/disputes on the environment.
In this case, the effects of the U.N.-imposed sanctions on Iraq's environment and people are examined. The paper contains a concise timeline of the 1990/1991 Gulf war and subsequent U.N. Security Council actions through about 1996..
CASE NUMBER: 390
CASE MNEMONIC: IRAQSANC
CASE NAME: Iraq Sanctions
After invading Kuwait in 1990, the U.N. began to sanction Iraq's egregious action. Since then, new sanctions have been placed on Iraq for its human rights violations and programs of mass destruction. In total, those sanctions are listed chronologically as follows:
Although food is available, sanctions have caused skyrocketing inflation and plunging wages. Skyrocketing inflation and plunging wages make it impossible for most people to buy on the free market, relying instead on the limited food rations the government provides at subsidized prices. As a result of sanctions, the economy has declined by an estimated 40%; Iraq's rate of inflation runs in the triple digits.(6)
Furthermore, sanctions have cut living standards to half their pre-war level. The cost of living (as a result of U.N. sanctions) has increased drastically for Iraq. To keep inflation in check, the Iraqi government has periodically cracked down on merchants-- accused of fueling inflation by overcharging products. Increasingly as worrisome to price control is the plunging value of the Iraqi dinar. On the black market, it has plunged far below its official rate of U.S. $l = Iraqi Dinar 0.60. The price of the dollar on the black market is well over 1000 dinars and continues to rise. In addition to shortages in the market place, Iraq's inflationary spiral is attributable to counterfeiting and its Central Bank's official laxed monetary policies.(7)
| Official Exchange Rate | U.S.$1=ID .60 | Black Market Rate | U.S.$1=ID .001 |
Although Iraq has sustained much damage from the sanctions, there has been some reconstruction. Much of the reconstruction which has gone on in Iraq has been temporary; Iraq has obtained the parts for its reconstruction by cannibalization of other industrial sectors. Rebuilding has been emphasized in areas visible to outsiders, thus, giving the impression that the sanctions are less deleterious than they truly are. Although civilian factories incurred little damage during the war, sanctions have forced most of the factories to either close or to drastically scale back their production. Sanctions have caused shortages of raw materials and spare parts used in production; as a result, unemployment is widespread.(8)
Sanctions have reduced Iraq to becoming a poor nation: a nation unable--with its rather meager funds--to feed itself let alone take measures to protect Iraq's environment. Currently, in Iraq, water and sanitation services are said to be in a critical state of disrepair. This is because Iraq has a lack of spare parts to repair damages both caused by the Iran-Iraq War and breakdowns of equipment. Such disrepair has led to Iraqi water tables becoming contaminated. Posing as equally detrimental to Iraqi water sources is the dumping of sewage into all major rivers: the source of drinking water.(10)
Additionally, shortages of equipment have forced Iraq's cities into becoming garbage dumps. With a shortage of spare parts to repair garbage trucks, garbage piles up in the cities. These garbage dumps pose as health hazards to the cities' poor, because the poor often forage through them looking for food.
The shortage of equipment caused by sanctions has also made Iraq more prone to oil spills (See Komi). Nonetheless, on the upside, sanctions, in some regards, may have been good for the Iraqi environment. This is because Iraq's exports of oil have been banned. Without a market to sell petrol, Iraq's chances of an oil spill are presumably less likely. Whether the chances of an oil spill has been decreased, when taking into consideration the shortage of equipment, is as of yet to be determined.
In addition to the deleterious effects of equipment shortages on the environment, Iraq's agricultural infrastructure has been "badly impaired." It has been impaired by a shortage of seeds, pesticides, fertilizers and harvesting equipment. Without proper planting and harvesting, once fertile Iraqi lands may become unfertile and arid.
Because the Iraqi military is unwilling to give into the economic pressures of sanctions, the mortality rate of Iraqi's sick, children, are increasing. In fact, three and a half million people are at risk of dyeing in Iraq, a half million of which are children under five. Iraqi's lives are threatened by shortages of drugs, medicines, and food. Although theoretically exempt from sanctions, Iraqi's health system has no money to buy pharmaceuticals. Therefore, drugs and other medicinal products are found in short supply.(11)
A recent mission monitoring the progress of an International Federation food and medicine relief program revealed:
As previously mentioned, sanctions have been disastrous to Iraq's economy and environment: They have caused shortages of goods in the marketplace and have contaminated Iraqi water supplies. Nonetheless, after five long years of sanctions, Saddam remains in power. The sanctions purpose was to force Saddam out of power; however, the sanctions have strengthened his resolve, while weakening his opposition.
Under the Sanctions, Saddam has rebuilt his army from the shattered wreck left in 1991. To this day, he continues to evade United Nations inspectors, trying to hide Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Before the beginning of September 1996 (when Saddam increased his onslaught on the Kurds), the U.N. Security Council was prepared to ease its economic sanctions enough to permit Iraq $2 billion or more in oil sales. Nonetheless, with the onslaught of the Kurds came new economic pressures.(13)
Of the 30 nations that contributed to the American-led, Gulf War coalition, only Britain, Germany and Kuwait openly supported Clinton's September 1996 cruise-missile retaliation. Even Saudi Arabia, the oil-rich crown jewel of American interests in the Persian Gulf region, pointedly demurred from endorsing a new round of retaliatory action against Saddam. It is not that Saddam is any less despised by his neighbors today than he was five years ago. The difference now is that the region deems him likely to survive.(15) Moreover, the Saudis and others see the world's will to subdue Saddam steadily eroding. After all, Russia, France, and China have publicly called for an easing of U.N. sanctions; and Western multinational corporations, such as Total and Elf, have recently signed onto agreements with Iraq, to be implemented after the lifting of sanctions.(16)
As a result, Saddam seems no worse off today, than he was before the Gulf War and--in several respects--he may have actually improved his prospects.
The international community immediately realized the gravity of the occupation of Kuwait from both a humanitarian and political point of view. It recognized the invasion and occupation as a violation of the international treaties governing the relations between states, as well as an act that violently disrupted progress towards international peace and a new world order.
Based on these considerations, the international community adopted a series of historic resolutions. They called for the liberation of Kuwait, and the restoration of its territories and legitimate government, even if this required the use of force. Kuwait was thus liberated through an unprecedented show of international will and solidarity.
Plaintiff: International Community
Defendant: Iraq
Iraq violated Chapter VII of the U.N. charter. Chapter VII deals with actions that threaten peace. The first Article of this chapter (Art. 39) stipulates: "The [United Nations] Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 41 allows the Security Council to decide what measures--precluding the use of armed forces--are to be to used to restore peace. Article 42 allows the Security Council--if it finds the measures taken under Article 41 are ineffective--to use military forces to restore international peace.
Since the sanctions on Iraq are partially attributable to its eradication of (Shiites and Kurds), this issue can be defined as Sub-National.
On the one hand, the impact of the sanctions were direct, because they directly impacted Iraq. However, on the other hand, the sanctions impact were indirect or, more appropriately put, were misdirected. The sanctions were misdirected because they strengthened the power and resolve of Saddam Hussein and his regime, while they weakened the Shiites and Kurds. Hussein's power was strengthened because his regime was able to circumscribe the intended effects of the sanctions, i.e., to make him weaker.
Hussein's survival has been based upon the following:
Iraq continues to export oil to Jordan (about 50,000 b/d). Jordan contends that the funds that Iraq would receive for the oil would instead be used to pay off Iraq's debt to Jordan. However, Jordan made no commitment about refraining from new loans to Iraq. Therefore, Jordan can contend with the letter of the sanctions while violating its spirit; Jordan can import Iraqi oil to repay old Iraqi debts, while extending new loans to Iraq in a transaction that amounts to the same thing as paying Iraq directly for the oil. Further, Turks have taken advantage of the $2.20 price differential between heavily subsidized Turkish oil and Iraqi oil. Turks are now estimated to be importing between 3,500 and 4,000 b/d. (Nonetheless, because of the shortage of equipment, Iraq's continued pumping of petrol means the probability of an environmentally deleterious oil spill occurring is extremely high.)
Following the Gulf War, the Iraqi government moved quickly to set up a rationing system, which allowed for the price of some goods to fluctuate based upon market demand: the higher the demand the higher the price. The system cut consumption, but, at the same time, managed to keep goods on the shelf. In addition, the Iraqi government took vigorous action to increase domestic food output. For example, there has been an emphasis placed on trimming the number of livestock, so as to free up cereals for human consumption. The reasoning behind this is that cereals are cheaper to produce and can be used to feed more people.(21) Thus, these adjustments have allowed Iraq the capacity to hold out against sanctions for a longer period of time.
Iraq is in part supporting its economy by the gold reserves and other assets it stole from Kuwait during the Gulf War. It is estimated by Intelligence reports that Iraq stole $4 billion in gold from Kuwaiti government coffers. The automobiles, durable goods, and antiquities that Iraq took from Kuwait and re-exported were estimated to be worth $300 million. An example of goods stolen from Kuwait were Mesopotamian antiquities. Their were reports of hundreds of looters swarming over archeological sites, carrying truckload of cuneiform tablets back to Iraq. So successful was the largely illegal trade in Mesopotamian antiquities, that a thriving business in Mesopotamian fakes has also grown in Iraq.(22)
In addition to Iraq's ability to finance itself through stolen gold and durable goods, there are rumors abound about large, undeclared Iraqi bank accounts abroad. Richard Newcomb, director of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control says, "It is my belief, and an operating assumption of the U.S. Treasury, that through secret accounts and investments, covert Iraqi front companies and clandestine agents of his regime, Saddam Hussein is attempting to sustain and proliferate his tools for disregarding the U.N. embargo."(23)
Unlike the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Iraq's Balance of Payments figures prior to the Gulf War are not complete: Iraq's export levels fail to be listed. What can be discerned form Iraq's balance of payments figures, however, is that their import levels declined in 1990--when sanctions were placed on Iraq.
| 1989 Import Level | 1990 Import Level |
|---|---|
| $6,965,000 | 4,834,000 |
No data, as of yet, has been given for the negligible effects the contamination of rivers has had on fish and birds. Nonetheless, upon speculation, it is estimated that the devastation the contamination has caused for the Iraqi eco- system is moderate to widespread.
| Name | Fish and Birds | Type | Animal |
Iraq is split between three major ethnic groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Arabs. Hussein's regime, in order to provide for the Sunni Arab minority that provides the backbone for Hussein's regime, has Supplied Sunni Arab's with ample supplies, while providing little to no supplies to Kurds and Shiites.
About 650,000 Iraqi refugees have crossed over the Iraqi border to Iran to escape Iraqi military operations directed against them.
More than 70,000 Iraqis, nearly half of them children under 5, died in the first half of 1996 because six years of U.N. sanctions have made medicine scarce; according to a government newspaper 70,274 Iraqis died because of a lack of medicine. This report could not be confirmed by the United Nations; however, relief organizations have consistently reported higher rates of disease, malnutrition and infant mortality in Iraq, than country's on average.(24)
Before the Gulf War, Iraq was one of the most affluent countries in the Middle East, with the government taking in an average of $10 billion a year from oil sales. The health crisis illustrates how much damage the sanctions have done. In 1989, the year before the embargo came into force, only 2,278 people died in Iraq because of a lack of medicine, Al-Thawra said. Of the 70,274 it said died in the first half of this year, 26,436 of them were children under five. According to U.N.I.C.E.F., about 4,500 Iraqi children have been dying each month from a variety of illnesses, compared with 600 a month before the Gulf War.(25)
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(1) Clawson, Patrick, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived?,
Institute for Strategic Studies: Washington, DC, 1993 pp.15-
75.
(2) Ibid, pp.20-95.
(3) Quigley, John, "The United States and the United Nations
in the Persian Gulf War: New Order and Disorder?," Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 85, Winter 1992, p. 17.
(4) Clifford Chance Homepage, 1995 and IBC Home Page,
Political Risk for Iraq.
(5) Ibid.
(6) IBC Home Page, Political Risk for Iraq.
(7) Edwards, Robert, "U.N. suppresses report on Iraq
suffering, " The Scotsman Publications Ltd., April 8, 1996.
(8) Clawson p. 33.
(9) Ibid p. 85..
(10) Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage of
Medicines Killed 70,000, August 1, 1996."
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Caldwel, Robert J., "U.S.-Iraq Conflict 1996," The San
Diego Union-Tribune, September 22, 1996.
(14) Ibid.
(15) "Clinton's Goal: Contain Iraq," Chicago Tribune,
September 19, 1996, p. 28.
(16) "All Eyes On The Market," The Middle East, May 1995. See
also "What to do with Saddam?," The Middle East, March 1995.
(17) "Down But Not Out", The Economist, April 8, 1995.
(18) "Kurds on the Run," The Middle East, April 1995.
(19) U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 of August 15,1991,
Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1991, p.46.
(20) Clawson, Patrick,"How Has Saddam...." p.49
(21) Ibid, p. 49
(22) Crosette, Barbara, "Iraqis, Hurt by Sanctions, Sell
Priceless Antiquities," The New York Times, June 22, 1996.
(22) Op cit, pp. 51-3 and 57. Although highly probable, the
existence of secret bank accounts, investments, and front
companies has not been substantiated.
(23) Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage..."
(24) Ibid.